

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/PV.243  
24 February 1966  
ENGLISH

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND FORTY-THIRD MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Thursday, 24 February 1966, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. Z. CERNIK

(Czechoslovakia)

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## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A. CORREA do LAGO  
Mr. G. de CARVALHO SILOS

Bulgaria:

Mr. C. LUKANOV  
Mr. Y. GOLEMANOV  
Mr. B. KONSTANTINOV  
Mr. D. POPOV

Burma:

U MAUNG MAUNG  
U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E. L. M. BURNS  
Mr. S. F. RAE  
Mr. C. J. MARSHALL  
Mr. P. D. LEE

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. Z. CERNIK  
Mr. V. VAJNAR  
Mr. R. KLEIN

Ethiopia:

Mr. A. ABERRA  
Mr. A. ZELLEKE  
Mr. B. ASSFAW  
Mr. A. MIKAEL

India:

Mr. V. C. TRIVEDI  
Mr. K. P. LUKOSE  
Mr. K. P. JAIN

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI  
Mr. G. P. TOZZOLI  
Mr. S. AVETTA  
Mr. F. SORO

Mexico:

Mr. A. GOMEZ ROBLEDO  
Mr. M. TELLO MACIAS

Nigeria:

Mr. L. C. N. OBI

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

Poland:

Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN  
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI  
Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI

Romania:

Mr. V. DUMITRESCU  
Mr. N. ECOBESCU  
Mr. C. UNGUREANU  
Mr. A. COROIANU

Sweden:

Mrs. A. MYRDAL  
Mr. P. HAMMARSKJOLD  
Mr. R. BOMAN  
Mr. I. VIRGIN

Union of Soviet Socialist  
Republics:

Mr. S. K. TSARAPKIN  
Mr. O. A. GRINEVSKY  
Mr. G. K. EFIMOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. H. KHALLAF  
Mr. A. OSMAN  
Mr. M. KASSEM  
Mr. M. SHAKER

United Kingdom:

Sir Harold BEELEY  
Mr. J. G. TAHOUDIN  
Miss E. J. M. RICHARDSON

United States of America:

Mr. C. H. TIMBERLAKE  
Mr. P. S. BRIDGES  
Mr. G. BUNN  
Mr. W. F. MILLER

Special Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. P. P. SPINELLI

Deputy Special Representative  
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Czechoslovakia) (translation from Russian): I declare open the two hundred and forty-third plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mrs. MYRDAL (Sweden): As this is the first occasion on which I have spoken in the present session of the Committee, I should like to express the condolences of my Government on the untimely death of the Prime Minister of Nigeria, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, and also on the great loss suffered by India through the death of the late Prime Minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri, and the late Chairman of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission, Dr. Homi Bhabha. During my tour of duty in India I had ample opportunity of appreciating the extraordinary value of those two men to their country and as human beings. Thus, for me, the sympathy extended to their fellow-countrymen and to their families not only is official but also has a special touch of personal warmth.

The Swedish delegation did not participate in the general debate at the beginning of the present session because we had so recently -- during the last session of the United Nations General Assembly and also in the Disarmament Commission last summer --- expounded our views in regard to the over-all picture of the present phase of disarmament negotiations. The specific characteristic of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament is, however, that it is not just one more forum for debate but is intended to be, and is, a closed group charged with the duty of negotiating and reaching positive agreements.

It seems to me that in the Committee's deliberations we now stand at just about mid-point between the initial, more general, debate on disarmament and a detailed scrutiny of the draft treaties and other documents pertaining to the issue of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, which is to be our first item of urgent negotiations. At that very juncture my delegation feels a need to raise a few questions in order to obtain clarification, without which we find it extremely difficult to formulate our own position in relation to the terms of such an agreement, which is desirable in itself but must also be quite watertight.

Particularly after hearing some statements made in the course of the general debate, we have become uncertain as to how those are related to the drafts and documents submitted earlier and how these new suggestions will enter into our negotiations. This is not least true of the very important statements made by the

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representatives of the nuclear Powers, with additional suggestions or some shift of emphasis discernible in the messages from their leaders and in their catalogues of proposals, point by point. My contribution today will consequently be, not a list of positive proposals offered by my Government for the conclusion of an agreement, but a list of queries. Answers to those questions -- or, rather, more precise explanations on the major issues -- are, I think, really prerequisites for a meaningful debate on non-proliferation.

My first question refers to a point of detail, although an important one, as it deals with controls. It has to be addressed in the first instance to the representative of the United States. At our first meeting of this session Mr. Foster brought to us President Johnson's message, the second point of which reads as follows:

"...through a non-proliferation treaty and through efforts outside such a treaty, we must continue to secure application of International Atomic Energy Agency or equivalent international safeguards over peaceful nuclear activities. To this end, I urge agreement that all transfers of nuclear materials or equipment for peaceful purposes to countries which do not have nuclear weapons be under IAEA or equivalent international safeguards. At the same time, the major nuclear Powers should accept in increasing measure the same international safeguards they recommend for other States.

"Recently, many responsible members of both Houses of the Congress of the United States introduced resolutions dealing with measures to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. These resolutions are an indication of the importance that the people of the United States attribute to such measures, and to the role that international safeguards should play in them. I fully share these views." (ENDC/165, p.2)

My question to the representative of the United States is whether this means that a substitute is now to be made for the rather vague clause about IAEA controls in article III of the United States draft treaty. There it is mentioned only that:

"Each of the States Party to this Treaty undertakes to co-operate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency or equivalent international safeguards on all peaceful nuclear activities." (ENDC/152, p.2)

Should this now be superseded by a more stringent regulation about IAEA controls in the first instance applied to all transfers to the non-nuclear countries? But how far do the President's words go: "I fully share these views"? Are they intended to signal to us that the United States now prefers the more far-reaching wording of the articles as outlined in the United States Senate resolution introduced by Senator Pastore? That wording is:

"1. Each of the non-nuclear States party to this treaty undertakes to accept International Atomic Energy Agency or similar international safeguards on all of their nuclear activities".

Here I underline "all of their nuclear activities", as this goes way beyond the "transfers of nuclear material or equipment" which I have just cited. The United States Senate resolution continues to refer, however, not only to non-nuclear States but to all States:

"2. Each of the States party to this treaty undertakes to provide source or fissionable material, or specialized equipment or non-nuclear material for the processing or use of source or fissionable material or for the production of fissionable material, to other States for peaceful purposes only if such material and equipment will be subject to International Atomic Energy Agency or similar international safeguards."<sup>1/</sup>

Thus my question is: what is in reality the scope of the undertakings about which we are now negotiating?

The Soviet draft treaty (ENDC/164), on the other hand -- and here I turn to the representative of the USSR, Mr. Tsarapkin -- does not contain any provision on safeguards; and so the second half of my question is: does this mean that the Soviet Government would not support a provision for IAEA or other equally effective safeguards against the use of nuclear energy for other than peaceful purposes? As Sweden has rather forcefully expressed itself in the United Nations in favour of such controls (A/C.1/PV.1365, p.26), and has been supported in this demand by the representative of Canada, Mr. Burns, in his statement to our Committee recently (ENDC/PV.241, pp. 11,12), we are most anxious to get this issue clarified, at least in a preliminary way, at an early stage of the debate.

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1/ Congressional Record, 18 January 1966, vol.112, no.6, p.472.

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In this connexion one is also tempted to ask for a clarification of these words that appear very often: "or equivalent international safeguards". It should not be overlooked that too wide a range of different control mechanisms, with varying rules, would tend to create confusion and diminish their total effectiveness. Which other safeguards are to be considered "equivalent"?

My second question follows from a further consideration of the passages I have just quoted. President Johnson's statement says that also "the major nuclear Powers" should increasingly accept safeguards. What is the exact significance of the limitation in this regard that lies in the distinction between major and other nuclear Powers? And how does it relate to the wider coverage of States indicated in paragraph 2 of the Senate resolution which I have just quoted? Should, or should not, control requirements refer to transfers to "non-major nuclear Powers", or, to use the new term employed here of late, "non-major nuclear weapon Powers"?

My third question is this. I believe that we must be much clearer as to what the arguments really are why a non-proliferation treaty should endeavour to cancel the nuclear option just for States which at present are non-nuclear. If there is something of an eleventh commandment -- "Thou shalt not carry nuclear weapons" --, why should it be valid only for some? Has the dividing line between those States which just at present have some nuclear-weapon capabilities and all other States any higher rationale?

It has been admitted in connexion with the plans for general and complete disarmament that "the titanic two" -- to quote Senator Pastore -- are in a special category in regard to nuclear weapons, as being responsible for preserving a balance of deterrence. But what are the arguments for national control of nuclear weapons in the cases of the other three which are now counted as nuclear-weapon Powers, or, to quote from the statement made last week by the representative of India, Mr. Trivedi:

"Why is it that a third country has chosen to be a nuclear weapon Power?  
Why is it that a fourth country is developing nuclear weapons and missiles?  
And why is it that a fifth country is embarking on a nuclear weapon programme?" (ENDC/PV.240, p.14)

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If there exist valid arguments for these States to possess nuclear weapons, why do they not apply to any other countries? I think we must be aware that in the political discussions inside our countries, at least in Europe, those who argue for production or acquisition of nuclear weapons, or at any rate for retaining the nuclear option, draw much of their support precisely from the argumentation in the non-major nuclear-weapon countries in our own part of the world.

It ought to go without saying that I am bringing forward these comments, not in order to suggest that non-nuclear weapon countries should "go nuclear", but rather in order to indicate that curtailment of the nuclear strength of the "have" nations must be a main consideration of our Committee.

Let me hurriedly turn this concern into a less political question, number four: can we really retain the simple division of countries into nuclear and non-nuclear which is now constitutive for the treaty drafts? Do we not in reality have a whole spectrum of positions which for the sake of simplicity might perhaps be broken up into roughly four different categories --

- (a) the nuclear super-Powers,
- (b) other Powers with at present certain nuclear-weapon capabilities,
- (c) States with potential nuclear-weapon capabilities, and
- (d) definitely non-nuclear weapon countries?

Can we really hope to encompass these highly-different situations in one and the same treaty?

This general problem may be pinpointed as a more specific one -- my question number five -- concerning procedure. I shall not now discuss the suggestion made by the representative of Nigeria at our meeting of 27 January that one might envisage two different treaties, one consisting of a mutual agreement between the nuclear Powers not to "disseminate", to be followed by a more comprehensive one on "non-proliferation", demanding also a pledge from the non-nuclear weapon countries about non-acquisition of nuclear weapons (ENDC/PV.235, pp.32,33). Today I only raise the question whether we should not during our debate concentrate in turn on each of the separate categories which I have just mentioned. There would be many practical reasons for doing so. I have already touched upon the question of control which obviously carries different exigencies -- and perhaps necessarily so -- for nations with nuclear weapons, those with nuclear capabilities in general and those without them.



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But there are other reasons. The presently most controversial issue, that of the multilateral nuclear force or the Atlantic nuclear force or nuclear sharing within NATO, must be agreed upon by the nuclear super-Powers. Until then it acts as an obstacle to truly responsible negotiations, which should begin to involve more directly also countries in the second category. On the other hand, we have proposals like the very important ones concerning nuclear-free zones, or envisaging a voluntary moratorium, as has been proposed by the delegation of Italy (ENDC/157), or even a "double moratorium", as was suggested in the United Nations by the Foreign Minister of Denmark (A/PV.1345, p.47), all of which are of immediate concern just to non-nuclear States and depend on their initiative. Is there a possibility of finding some procedural arrangement by which the debate could move somewhat separately but concurrently in these two different spheres of interest in order to speed up our work?

In turn, this problem is related to a much wider one, question number six, which the representatives of the non-aligned States in our Committee and elsewhere have incessantly endeavoured to keep in the foreground. I am of course referring to the consideration of some correspondence between sacrifices of the nuclear option on the part of non-nuclear weapon States, and sacrifices on the part of those countries which are actually "proliferating" nuclear weapons in the sense of increasing their numbers and developing their performance. The position of the non-nuclear weapon countries, and specifically of the non-aligned among those, was authoritatively stated on 15 September last year in the Joint Memorandum of Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. I do not want to expound or interpret the thesis, but just to quote it straightforwardly:

"The eight delegations are convinced that measures to prohibit the spread of nuclear weapons should, therefore, be coupled with or followed by tangible steps to halt the nuclear arms race and to limit, reduce and eliminate the stocks of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery."

(ENDC/158)

A reference to this justified demand, so many times reiterated and so widely supported, was also contained in the United Nations resolution 2028 (XX) (ENDC/161),

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which is basic to our work. The resolution calls for an acceptable balance in the mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and the non-nuclear Powers.

How, then, is this matter going to be dealt with during the present session? Must we not carry on negotiations simultaneously on such other collateral measures on which an agreement would prove to the world that the nuclear-weapon States are not only interested in shutting off the nuclear option for other States, but truly interested in stifling their own nuclear arms race?

My delegation has persistently pointed to a comprehensive test ban and a cut-off of production of fissionable material for weapon purposes as measures which, although not commensurate in terms of sacrifices, would definitely testify to a willingness on the part of all States -- the "haves" and the "have-nots" alike -- to forgo further weapon development and the building-up of stockpiles in the nuclear field. These two measures are among the seven points in the message from President Johnson (ENDC/165) presented to the 235th meeting; and the one concerning the test ban is also among the points contained in the message from the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (ENDC/167) presented to the 237th meeting.

We therefore ask the Committee at what juncture negotiations can start in earnest on these matters. Perhaps the examination of the entry-into-force clauses at the end of the present draft treaties on non-proliferation would offer a convenient opportunity for such a discussion. The entry into force of the treaties to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons is, in the present drafts, made contingent only upon the adherence of certain States. The question might be pondered as to what extent an agreement on other measures which constitute "tangible steps to halt the nuclear arms race" (ENDC/158) -- such as a complete test ban, or, as perhaps is most germane to the non-proliferation issue, a cut-off of further production of nuclear weapon material -- might be related to the entry into force of a non-proliferation treaty.

There are a few additional questions I want to raise, and I apologize that the next ones are complicated -- or rather, the subject matter is complicated --, but my questions are motivated by a desire to arrive at clarification. One -- and this is question number seven -- is the fundamental query: what exactly is going to be prohibited by a treaty on non-proliferation?

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United Nations resolution 2028 (XX) does not contain any definition: it just refers to a treaty "to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons". The term is used nine times, as a matter of fact. The Joint Memorandum of the eight non-aligned nations (ENDC/158), just referred to, is, I regret to say, no more specific. A glance at the various drafts of treaty texts submitted gives more guidance, but, alas, not unequivocal guidance. The Italian draft of a unilateral non-acquisition declaration (ENDC/157) aims at prohibition of (a) manufacture and b) acquisition of national control of nuclear weapons. This corresponds fairly closely to the prohibitory clause in the United States draft treaty (ENDC/152) pointing to (a) manufacture and (b) seeking or receiving the transfer into national control of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union draft treaty (ENDC/164) goes further in that what it wants to prohibit is, under (a), the creation, manufacture or preparation for manufacture, and, under (b), the obtaining of nuclear weapons in any form for purposes of ownership, control or use and participation in the ownership, control or use of such weapons, or in testing them.

I do not propose to deal at all today with the significance of the varying scope given to the concepts of proliferation and dissemination as such -- particularly in regard to the politically burning issues of "national control", "sharing of control" and "participation in ownership". I want to place in focus another, hitherto neglected difference of a more practical character: the question what more precisely is meant by the term "prepare for manufacture". We could, of course, all agree that it is important to block the road to nuclear-weapon development as early as possible. But we must be aware that what we are facing is a long ladder with many rungs, and the practical question is: on which of these is it reasonable and feasible to introduce the international blocking? The question is interconnected with the one of control: where is that step located at which clear evidence of "preparation" begins to show and at which international control can be made effective?

Obviously the whole course of decisions should be mapped before we select the crucial point. In a first stage there would be the planning decisions, running from decisions to undertake research on nuclear weapons to decisions to engage in a study of alternative construction programmes, to decisions to obtain fissionable material for weapon purposes, perhaps by establishing a gas-diffusion

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or chemical-separation plant, on to political decisions to start on the road to construct some nuclear weapon and to test it. In a subsequent series there are actual operational decisions, when plants are being built, tests organized, and other establishments or acts undertaken, which give visible and conclusive evidence --- and this the previous series of decisions hardly do.

To prohibit just the final act of "manufacture" would seem to come late in these long chains of decisions. On the other hand, already to probe the preliminary thinking of politicians and the laboratory research of scientists obviously is as difficult, as it would be considered undesirable intervention. Could a middle link be found on which the prohibitory regulation should most definitely be focused? Do the authors of the drafts envisage perhaps some splitting-up of the regulations so that, for instance, actual acquisition through transfer or manufacture of nuclear weapons would be the action prohibited, while States were perhaps merely urged to "refrain from" preparations? Further, and most important: must not regulations about effective controls be linked with certain definitive and uncontestable steps, such as actual purchases of nuclear reactors, fuel elements and so on from abroad, and/or the establishment within a country of such installations as plutonium separation plants and the like?

Of course, my questions are not intended to pre-empt the debate, but could we already at the preliminary stage of the negotiations at least get from the authors of the various proposals succinct statements concerning exactly at what steps they want to place the international treaty obligations not to "proliferate"?

My next question, number eight, refers to a matter where a term has taken on great importance but where we are as yet at a loss to understand precisely what the positions of the various parties are. Clarification as to the correct interpretation is now highly desirable in regard to the word "guarantees". That term has been used in at least two diametrically-opposed meanings in connexion with our debates. One meaning has been sponsored by the United States as lately as in President Johnson's message, where it is formulated as follows:

"Meanwhile, the nations that do not seek the nuclear path can be sure that they will have our strong support against threats of nuclear blackmail."

(ENDC/165, p.2)

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The other meaning has been most incisively and most persistently brought forward by Nigeria, and is as follows:

"An indispensable element in any non-proliferation measure is, therefore, a firm undertaking, with adequate guarantees by the nuclear Powers not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear Powers under any circumstances whatever, or to threaten to use them." (ENDC/PV.235, p.31)

A later version in rather specific terms, intended for inclusion in the draft treaty, is contained in the important message from the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, Mr. Kosygin. It envisages prohibiting "the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States parties to the treaty which have no nuclear weapons in their territory." (ENDC/167, p.3)

Before we, as a non-aligned State, can be ready to declare our position in relation to any guarantees proffered, we must be clear as to how the nuclear Powers stand in relation to these two very different concepts. Again, it would seem difficult to include in a universally-valid agreement just one of the concepts, as the world of reality offers situations which are so highly different. One can distinguish a series of at least three different types of situations:

The first would be the one pertaining to nuclear-free countries within alliances where a guarantee of nuclear protection is already functioning and in any event applicable.

The second would be the one of non-aligned countries, within or outside any nuclear-free zone, which might want the second kind of guarantee: a pledge from the nuclear parties to the treaty not to use nuclear weapons against countries which have forgone the obtaining of such weapons.

The third situation would be one where non-aligned countries perceived a threat from some nuclear Power not a party to the treaty.

Perhaps there are even more variations possible on this theme. My concern has been only to solicit some clear statements as to the authoritative views on the applicability of the different kinds of guarantees or pledges in situations varying as widely as I have just indicated.

My ninth, and final, question refers to the time aspect of the agreement to be reached. We are here, as I understand it, confronted with four different

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possibilities. To take them in the order of diminishing finality, we have in the first instance the Soviet Union draft treaty expressing the view that the treaty "shall be of unlimited duration" (ENDC/164, p.6). An alternative that would seem to follow next would be the provision in the United States draft treaty that after a certain number of years a conference might be held "in order to review the operation of the Treaty" (ENDC/152, p.3). Thereafter follows the suggestion tentatively made by the representative of Canada last week, in an endeavour to meet the preoccupations particularly of the non-nuclear signatories to the treaty, that it might only run for "a specified period" of time (ENDC/PV.241, p.13). Lastly, one may of course envisage a fourth, even less committing, formula in the event that no agreement should prove possible on any of the three first-mentioned ones. I refer to the suggestions made by the Italian delegation in its draft of a unilateral non-acquisition declaration (ENDC/157) that the pledge of not acquiring nuclear weapons should be undertaken for only a period of a specified number of years.

All the three last suggestions --- that is, those considering the possibility of a treaty short of permanency --- are evidently designed to give a respite to the nuclear Powers to produce agreements on those other measures to "limit, reduce and eliminate the stocks of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery" (ENDC/158) which the non-aligned countries have requested. But which is really preferable: to have some time-limit built into the treaty, or to have the "tangible steps to halt the nuclear arms race" (ibid.) materialize simultaneously with the treaty on non-proliferation? On this particular point one would rather want to hear the views of other representatives in order to have a clearer perspective before we start an article-by-article consideration.

Those were some remarks and suggestions for clarification which my delegation considered it appropriate to make at the present stage of our deliberations on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. I have formulated the questions with a certain frankness, my intention being to stimulate a discussion likely to clarify further the positions of the delegations, including in particular the delegations of the nuclear-weapon Powers. These problems are so important that no effort should be spared in order to establish our positions as exactly as possible. I

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trust that we all agree that no "loop-holes" should be left for misunderstandings or contradictory interpretations. Only when we are all absolutely clear about the implication of certain terms used and offers made, can a detailed examination of the two draft treaties and other related documents be undertaken with an assurance of success. It is the hope of the Swedish delegation that these remarks will facilitate such a development and that truly important and effective steps can soon be taken towards disarming the terrifying nuclear danger.

Mr. LUKANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from Russian): I hasten to join those delegations which have welcomed the distinguished representative of Burma, Ambassador U Maung Maung, as he joins us in our work. We wish him success in participating in the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

I should like to deal briefly with one or two considerations on the subject of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and in particular with the draft treaties in this regard which have been submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (ENDC/164) and the United States of America (ENDC/152). But before I begin my statement on non-proliferation I shall take the liberty of drawing the Committee's attention to a matter which has been very rightly taken up by the distinguished representative of the USSR, Mr. Tsarapkin. I refer to the accident which befell a United States B-52 bomber carrying nuclear weapons on 17 January of this year over Almeria in Spain, and the extremely dangerous consequences for peace and the fate of humanity which could arise in the future as a result of such or similar occurrences.

The aide-mémoire of the Soviet Government to the Government of the United States, dated 16 February 1966, states:

"As a result of this accident, four hydrogen bombs, each of them a hundred times more powerful than the bomb dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, fell on Spanish territory and the coastal waters of the Mediterranean Sea. The detonator of at least one of these bombs exploded, and radioactive substances were released. There is a danger of radioactive contamination also from the other hydrogen bomb, which is lying at the bottom of the Mediterranean Sea. A large and densely populated area is threatened with radioactive contamination. Naturally, the peoples are profoundly perturbed by all these facts.

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"The Soviet Government draws attention to the fact that the activities which have resulted in the aforesaid events are at variance with the generally accepted principles and standards of international law and with those obligations which the United States Government has assumed under international treaties and agreements in force, and, in particular, under the 1963 Moscow Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water." (ENDC/169).

In the light of these facts it is not difficult to realize that flights by United States bombers carrying nuclear weapons involve a dangerous risk of such incidents being repeated. For this reason we believe that it is in the interests of all peoples to demand imperatively the banning, once and for all, of flights by bombers carrying nuclear weapons beyond the borders of national territories. This ban should be put into effect as soon as possible. The skies above our planet should not conceal this ominous threat to human life and health. There must be no place in the skies for these carriers of nuclear death. The Bulgarian delegation regards as timely the proposal of the Soviet delegation (ENDC/PV.241, pp.8,9) that the Eighteen-Nation Committee should issue an appeal for the immediate discontinuance of flights by aircraft carrying nuclear weapons beyond the limits of the national borders of States; it fully supports this proposal.

One can only express regret at the lighthearted -- to put it mildly -- attitude which the delegation of the United States of America has shown towards this question (ENDC/PV.238, p.20; PV.241, p.41). In the light of the task of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to find a way towards general disarmament, towards nuclear disarmament in the first place and towards a reduction of international tension in particular, what happened off the Spanish coast on



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17 January last is of no small importance. Nevertheless, the delegation of the United States has tried to play down the incident and to justify the intolerable activities of its air force, alleging that the accident to the B-52 aircraft proves how superb is the United States' mastery of its nuclear weapons -- in other words, that this accident is not proof of the danger but proof of the safeness of jaunts with nuclear weapons above foreign territories and above the open sea!

To make such a claim after the thirteenth or maybe the seventeenth accident of this kind is only possible when one wishes to defend, at all costs, an indefensible policy of nuclear blackmail. Can one regard as testifying to the unimportance and harmlessness of what occurred, the fact that for over a month the United States military authorities have been searching for the dropped bombs, destroying during that time the livestock and the harvest of the peasants in the area where they fell, removing and burying the top-soil far away from inhabited places -- in a word, trying to push back into its bottle the evil, in this case the atomic jinn which they have released? That is why we must firmly oppose the delegation of the United States of America when it describes as propaganda the condemnation of the military who venture to keep lethal weapons up in the air and rushing about in various parts of the globe.

In Mr. Foster's reply of 17 February (ENDC/PV.241, p.41) there is to be seen the intention of the United States to continue its intolerable activities in defiance of the whole of world opinion. If we are to believe the United States explanations, then it follows that the Moscow Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water (ENDC/100/Rev.1) permits the risk of radioactive contamination of the atmosphere and the waters of the sea when this risk is due to the United States Air Force. Obviously the Moscow Treaty does not permit this; on the contrary it forbids it, and the whole world has the right to demand of the United States of America the discontinuance of flights by aircraft with nuclear weapons over foreign territories.

Turning to the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, I should like first of all to recall a point on which it appears we are all agreed: that if measures are not speedily taken to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons,

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the security of all Powers will be menaced and the achievement of general and complete disarmament will be rendered extremely difficult. In stressing the urgency of the matter, however, one should not forget some of its other fundamental aspects. Which aspects do we have in mind?

First, there is the fact that the conclusion of a treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is not an end in itself, as many delegations have rightly pointed out. Such a treaty must be a step forward on the path towards nuclear disarmament, and towards general and complete disarmament. Consequently it cannot be aimed -- as some people fear -- at the perpetuation of the distinction between nuclear and non-nuclear States, but will contribute to the creation of the conditions under which all Powers will become non-nuclear.

Secondly, it follows from what I have just said that a treaty on non-proliferation, in accordance with resolution 2028 (XX) of the General Assembly of the United Nations,

" ... should be void of any loop-holes which might permit nuclear or non-nuclear

Powers to proliferate, directly or indirectly, nuclear weapons ..." (ENDC/161)

The prohibition of the proliferation of nuclear weapons should, essentially, be absolute. Otherwise, if exceptions of one kind or another are provided for or permitted, non-proliferation will turn into its opposite.

Thirdly, with a view to the achievement of concrete results, the problem of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons should not be tied to other partial measures, such as the banning of underground nuclear weapon tests, the banning of the use of nuclear weapons, and so on. This problem has its own independent, enormous significance.

Fourthly, a treaty on non-proliferation raises the problem of guarantees. We believe that a realistic and reasonable solution to this problem can be achieved on the basis of the relevant proposals in the message of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mr. Kosygin (ENDC/167).

(Mr. Lukanov, Bulgaria)

I have taken the liberty of drawing attention to those aspects of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons to which the Bulgarian delegation attaches great significance, in order to characterize its approach in seeking for a correct solution to the problem.

Our delegation has already expressed its readiness to examine any proposal for the unconditioned prohibition of the further spread of nuclear weapons. So far we have before us two concrete draft treaties. We consider that at the present stage of the discussion we should concentrate our attention on an analysis of those provisions of the two drafts which lay down the basic obligations of States. In both drafts those provisions are contained in articles I, II and III.

After articles I and II of the United States draft treaty have been carefully studied, it becomes clear that they do block some channels for the proliferation of nuclear weapons; but they do not block all of them. On the contrary, these articles deliberately leave the door open for certain forms of proliferation of nuclear weapons. Likewise President Johnson's message (ENDC/165) does not introduce any change of principle into the position of the United States on this question. It is clear that the United States of America, in presenting such a formulation of articles I and II, is trying to ensure that the ban on the proliferation of nuclear weapons should not cover such a form of proliferation as the access of non-nuclear States to nuclear weapons within the framework of the NATO military alliance.

It would be logical to ask the question: what aim does the United States draft pursue -- proliferation or non-proliferation? It has become obvious that the Government of the United States is concerned about how to give access to nuclear weapons, in one form or another, to the West German revenge-seekers. This is perfectly clear, and it seems to me that there is no need to submit much evidence in support of this conviction. It is sufficient, for instance, to recall what the head of the United States delegation, Mr. Foster, stated at the last session of the Committee.

(Mr. Lukanov, Bulgaria)

"We therefore have every reason so to shape the language of our draft treaty that if at some time in the future the nations of Western Europe, or a substantial number of them, come to form some sort of political union they will not be confronted with an unmanageable problem because of our inadvertence here in drafting the text of a treaty.

"We would not want to preclude for all time any new collective political and defence entity which might, with great effort and patience, be created over an extended period in Western Europe. We would not want to preclude such an entity from possessing and controlling nuclear weapons if it should in fact develop the capability to assume the nuclear defence responsibilities of its formerly separate national components some of which are now nuclear Powers."  
(ENDC/PV.228, p.39)

As a matter of fact, the delegations of the Western Powers in the Committee make no secret of their intention to enable the Federal Republic of Germany to participate in nuclear affairs, or of their NATO approach to the problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. As we have already stated, what the Western delegations are guided by in their approach to a problem which concerns everyone is not the interests of all the States of the world but the narrow interests of the NATO military alliance. Indeed, this is no longer a secret.

There is something else which the representatives of NATO are still trying to cover up: namely the true face of the policy of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany. We see how the allies here of that militaristic State put on naively-offended facial expressions as soon as Bonn's revanchist policy is mentioned in our Committee room. Yet no one even attempts to refute the assertions of the socialist delegations; it is considered sufficient to say that black is white. How, for instance, is it possible to refute the statement, quoted by the Czechoslovak delegation, which was made by Minister Krone, Chairman of the National Defence Council of the Federal Republic of Germany? He said the following:

"... there are at present two closely-related problems in the forefront of international consideration: the idea of preventing, through international agreement, further proliferation of nuclear weapons; and

(Mr. Lukanov, Bulgaria)

the necessity of sharing atomic decisions in the Western Alliance with those of its members that are not themselves in possession of nuclear weapons.

"... What our security mainly requires is a participation of the Federal Republic of Germany in the important atomic decisions of the alliance ...

"... As for the problem of an international ban on the proliferation of nuclear weapons, our main anxiety is that such an arrangement might ... eliminate as well any effective say in the nuclear matters of the Western alliance...

"... If the Western allies work out a satisfactory arrangement for German participation in nuclear decisions, we shall be in a position, on our part, to do without the acquisition of nuclear weapons..." (Bulletin of the Press and Information Office of the German Federal Government, No. 7849, 15 January 1966).

What a difference there is between that way of dealing with the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the way it is dealt with in the Statement of the Government of the German Democratic Republic (ENDC/168)! Not until the Bonn Government makes such a statement to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament as the Government of the German Democratic Republic has made will it be possible to speak of the Bonn Government's contribution towards the objective of non-proliferation, about which Mr. Foster speaks in spite of the facts (ENDC/PV.235, p.26).

Thus the texts of articles I and II of the United States draft treaty and the aims which they pursue do not provide any grounds for thinking that the Western countries, regardless of their statements, are anxious to conclude a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons which would be of a comprehensive nature. As is obvious, the United States and its NATO allies are really thinking about creating a sort of third category of Powers -- something that is inadmissible if the conclusion of a comprehensive non-proliferation treaty is desired. In this connexion I want to express complete agreement with what the representative of India, Mr. Trivedi, stated on 15 February:

(Mr. Lukanov, Bulgaria)

" .... the treaty must prohibit all aspects of proliferation, direct or indirect, through military alliances or otherwise and in any form or shape. As a non-aligned nation we are unable to understand why members of military alliances should receive a special dispensation in the context of non-proliferation. There cannot be three categories of nations: nuclear nations, non-nuclear nations in alliance with nuclear nations, and non-nuclear non-aligned nations." (ENDC/PV.240, p.16)

Although the United States draft treaty (ENDC/152) does contain individual positive elements, it does not conform with the first and most important principle of resolution 2028 (XX). It is true that the United States draft was submitted to the Committee before the resolution was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly. One could have hoped that the United States Government would introduce corresponding amendments into its draft, bearing in mind the basic provisions of the resolution which express the general opinion of the United Nations. However, nothing of the sort happened. Basically the position of the United States on this question has remained unchanged, and this, of course, cannot make the Committee's task any easier.

As for article III of the United States draft treaty, we have serious reservations in regard to its text, to which we shall return in due course.

Whereas the United States draft treaty is not based on the concept of the conclusion of a comprehensive treaty, and does not exclude completely the possibility of carrying out plans for the actual proliferation of nuclear weapons in forms correctly described by the representative of Czechoslovakia as indirect and in many respects even more dangerous (ENDC/PV.242, p.35), the Soviet draft treaty (ENDC/164) proposes a solution of the question fully in accordance with resolution 2028 (XX), which expresses the will of the peoples: to block any loop-holes for the further spread of nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Lukanov, Bulgaria)

As can easily be seen, the text of article I of the Soviet draft is comprehensive and precise. It not only prohibits the transfer of nuclear weapons to the national control of a non-nuclear State, but also closes all channels for the proliferation of nuclear weapons in any form, direct or indirect. Thus in our opinion the wording of article I of the Soviet draft clearly defines the obligations of the nuclear Powers, as is required of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Particularly important, in our opinion, is the fact that the Soviet draft provides for the prohibition not only of the acquisition and manufacture of nuclear weapons but also of preparations for their manufacture. This provision is of great importance because it ties to the utmost extent the hands of a possible violator of the treaty who might want to confront the world with a fait accompli.

Another important provision, contained in the text of article II of the Soviet draft, is the prohibition of the joint-manufacture of nuclear weapons. Obviously this is intended to exclude the possibility of circumventing the treaty by organizing the manufacture of nuclear weapons within the framework of any inter-State alliances.

We should like to emphasize particularly that article II also includes an unconditional ban on the manufacture and preparations for the manufacture of nuclear weapons in the territory of other States. This is all the more urgent because, as has often been reported in the Press, some political leaders in the Federal Republic of Germany are discussing the question of how to circumvent the obligation not to manufacture nuclear weapons in its territory.

The text of article III of the Soviet draft binds all States parties to the treaty to refrain from offering any support, encouragement or inducement to States seeking to own, manufacture or exercise control over nuclear weapons.

Thus the Soviet draft treaty fully corresponds with the aim of effectively preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and provides for the prohibition of all ways and means of proliferating nuclear weapons in any form, direct or indirect. This is the basic feature of the Soviet draft and the principal difference between it and the United States draft.

(Mr. Lukanov, Bulgaria)

In analysing the basic provisions of the Soviet draft, and the proposal contained in the Message from Chairman A. Kosygin to the Committee that -

"... The Soviet Government declares its willingness to include in the draft treaty a clause on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States parties to the treaty which have no nuclear weapons in their territory" (ENDC/167, p.3),

we find that this draft is a reasonable and reliable basis for the conclusion of a comprehensive treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The Bulgarian delegation therefore believes that the Eighteen-Nation Committee can solve forthwith and successfully the task entrusted to it by resolution 2028 (XX) of the United Nations General Assembly by taking the Soviet draft treaty as the basis for negotiations.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): I should like to say first of all that, in the Italian delegation's opinion, the Committee should be very grateful for the contribution that Mrs. Myrdal, the representative of Sweden, once again made to our work this morning. Mrs. Myrdal said that today, rather than propose solutions, she wished to put some questions to us. But the very way in which she put those questions was constructive, for she began by referring to problems of the greatest importance which this Committee will certainly have to go into thoroughly. Moreover, her questions seem to indicate what replies she wanted: positive, affirmative and constructive replies promoting the purposes we have set ourselves.

I was particularly struck by the question that Mrs. Myrdal put concerning the possibility of developing our procedure in such a way as to make our work more comprehensive and complete. In that connexion I should like to thank her for having reminded us that the Italian proposal for a moratorium (ENDC/157) is one of the subjects that should be taken into account in intensifying our work procedure. The suggestion that the scope of the Committee's work should be extended so as to facilitate progress, especially with regard to non-proliferation, is an idea which deserves thorough examination. Indeed, I intend to peruse the whole of Mrs. Myrdal's speech with the greatest care, as I think that every word of it is the result of considered and profound study.



(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

Nevertheless, Mr. Chairman, the reason why I asked for the floor to make a very short statement was that I wished to take advantage of the time available to reply to some remarks which the representative of Poland and yourself have been good enough to make on the subject of my previous statements. I am making these replies, not out of a wish to continue a controversy and to waste the Committee's time, but in the hope of bringing about greater mutual understanding and progress in this work of mutual clarification which seems to me to be so necessary.

Mr. Blusztajn said (ENDC/PV.241, pp.17, 18) that he could not accept my concept of non-proliferation. That concept would enable existing alliances to continue and to develop their military co-operation, provided, of course, that did not involve the proliferation of nuclear weapons. He added that such a concept would engender discrimination between the non-nuclear countries and would bring about, or at least might bring about, an increase in international tension.

I do not think there can be any doubt that an agreement on non-proliferation is a collateral measure. In that connexion I should like to point out that you yourself, Mr. Chairman, as representative of Czechoslovakia, essentially agreed with me when you made the following statement at our meeting on 22 February:

"First, there can be no doubt that a non-proliferation treaty is not aimed at the dissolution of existing military alliances. Nor is its purpose to interfere in the activity or internal affairs of these alliances. However, this premise, of course, remains valid only as long as their activity does not affect the field of proliferation of nuclear weapons." (ENDC/PV.242, p.31)

I must say, Mr. Chairman, that I fully agree with you on this point. This situation, to which you yourself referred, does not, as Mr. Blusztajn pointed out, create any discrimination between non-nuclear countries participating in an alliance and unaligned non-nuclear countries. Even after signing the non-proliferation treaty, these two categories of countries would retain the special characteristics and differences which they have now.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

The former -- that is, the non-nuclear countries members of an alliance -- have deemed it necessary for their security to join together and in particular to associate themselves with nuclear countries. The others, the unaligned countries, have not deemed this association to be necessary or even desirable. Those countries would therefore lack, both before and after the non-proliferation treaty, certain rights which normally accrue from any association. But those are precisely rights which they do not wish to have.

If there can be any question of discrimination, it might be said to exist already. But in fact the question is one not of discrimination but of a difference -- a difference which lies in the very essence of the unaligned and which is the result of a choice freely made. It is even a difference to which the unaligned countries are very attached and of which they are very jealous. This difference will remain until the process of disarmament makes alliances useless and purposeless, and until the balance now ensured by alliances -- a balance which is also to the advantage of the unaligned -- is established by different and better means than by armaments.

In this connexion I should like to refer to the second objection raised by Mr. Blusztajn, when he said that my concept of non-proliferation might result in increasing international tension (ENDC/PV.241, p.18). I should like to assure Mr. Blusztajn that for my part I am absolutely convinced that a non-proliferation agreement would, on the contrary, be an important factor of rapprochement and relaxation of tension. That is one of the principal reasons for the treaty. I mean that the non-nuclear Powers are prepared to renounce certain rights precisely because they are confident that this will be a first step, to be followed by others, and that the non-proliferation treaty will have very broad and general significance and political effect. That does not mean that the collateral measure in question -- the non-proliferation agreement -- can go beyond its proper limits, or that its application can prevent, within the framework of an alliance, collaboration which does not constitute proliferation.

Of course we may be asked what are the arrangements we wish to remain free to make in our alliance, and whether we are not seeking by this means to evade the prohibitions of non-proliferation and to take back with one hand what we have given with the other. But the answer to this question is easy, and we can make

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

it in all sincerity. Of course, any arrangements which may be made within an alliance depend solely on the alliance itself. But if a non-proliferation agreement is concluded, the alliance will no longer have a free choice. A non-proliferation treaty will serve to erect a barrier which members of the alliance cannot cross in working out any possible arrangements. That barrier, as we have pointed out on the Western side, should not allow a country to obtain control of nuclear weapons. It can and must be controlled and defended by all parties to the treaty. If the barrier is crossed and if higher interests of security are imperilled -- a hypothesis which we absolutely refuse to entertain -- the parties to the treaty can always invoke its article VI -- which is the same in both drafts -- and free themselves from their obligations.

This barrier is not yet a reality, because the non-proliferation treaty has not yet been concluded. Nevertheless, the Western countries, which want and are prepared to do everything in their power to bring the treaty into being, are already trying to ensure, in the conversations now in progress, that nothing shall jeopardize or hinder the establishment of this barrier.

So far as we are concerned, therefore, the way is open to an agreement, and that agreement will safeguard the security of everyone. Our position is clear and should not lead to any misunderstandings or false interpretations. We hope that the Eastern countries will realize that it is only by ensuring better security for all -- nuclear and non-nuclear, unaligned and non-nuclear aligned -- that a non-proliferation treaty can be achieved and accepted by everyone.

Mr. TIMBERLAKE (United States of America): This is, I believe, the last time that our Nigerian friend and colleague Mr. Obi will be with us. I should like to say how much we shall miss him, and to wish him every success in his next assignment.

Mr. Obi has been an extremely able exponent of his country's views, a strong supporter of arms control and disarmament, and a warm friend of all of us. I hope he will not forget us, or our work, as he goes forth to deal with other urgent problems. We shall all remember his warm friendship and able assistance in our work here, and my delegation hopes that we shall see him again, whether it is in New York, in Geneva or elsewhere, and that it will not be in the too distant future.

Mr. OBI (Nigeria): Before making a brief reply to the statement of the United States representative, I should like to say how interested I was to hear the statement made this morning by Mrs. Myrdal. My delegation, will, I am sure, study it very carefully and make its views known in due course. But I cannot help pointing out that Mrs. Myrdal has placed a finger -- and, very rightly, if I may say so -- on the essential facets of the proposal which my delegation made in New York (A/C.1/PV.1356, pp.27-31) and which I repeated here (ENDC/PV.235, pp.31, 32).

In listening to Mr. Timberlake I was reminded of the following incident which took place some years ago, when I was rather young. I commented that I did not understand why a woman who is not too good-looking -- who in fact is rather plain -- still appreciates flattery. I was told by someone who knew that the reason is that, although she may have a mirror in her house and use it as often as those who are better endowed physically, she feels flattered none the less because someone has taken the pains to pay what might be considered an extravagant compliment.

I am afraid that I find myself in the position of that rather plain woman, knowing full well that the compliments are extravagant but are well meant. It is a great pity that owing to a personal handicap, I have not been able to pay my respects to all representatives here before departing. Therefore I should like to seize this opportunity to place on record my deep appreciation for the co-operation and interest which has been shown by the various heads and other members of delegations.

In a semi-facetious manner I have commented, during the past few weeks, on the rather remarkable fact that the venerable heads of delegations here, between whom and myself there is considerable disparity in rank and age, have tolerated the perhaps over-exuberance of one so young and immature. This is a very pleasant commentary on their patience and forbearance, and also a lesson to one so young and inexperienced as myself. This I will treasure wherever I go.

(Mr. Obi, Nigeria)

I should also like to place on record my gratitude for the co-operation and consideration which I have received from the individual members of the various delegations, including those hard-working ones who analyse speeches and also write speeches to be delivered by their heads of delegation. The fact that we found it easy to work together is, in my opinion, due largely to them.

"All good things" -- as someone said -- "must come to an end". I am sorry that I do not remember who said that, but I am sure that Mrs. Teslenko, the excellent chief of the verbatim reporting staff, will find the reference easily.

I should like to say that I have found my association with disarmament over a period of almost four years to have been most valuable indeed. The first time I came here I was rather frustrated. That feeling has given place to one of resignation; but I must hasten to point out that it is not resignation to the point of giving up hope of any agreement; on the contrary, I do hope -- and I am sure -- that within a very short time the Committee will be able to make progress in a few fields: notably in connexion with an agreement to ban all nuclear weapon tests, and on certain measures which will help to halt the spread of nuclear weapons.

Before concluding, I should like to express my deepest appreciation to the secretariat: to Mr. Spinelli, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, from whom we have had a great deal of assistance recently; to Mr. Epstein, who is a valuable mine of information, and to his very hard-working staff -- those whom we see here often and those whom we do not see. I thank you all.

The CHAIRMAN (Czechoslovakia) (translation from Russian): Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. I think I speak on behalf of all our delegations when I express to you our thanks for the work which you have performed on behalf of your delegation in the Eighteen-Nation Committee in a matter which is very important for the whole world, for world security. I hope that we shall meet again, perhaps here in Geneva or perhaps in New York or elsewhere. I should like to wish you good luck on behalf of all delegations. We shall always remember your participation in the work of this Committee.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 243rd meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H. E. Ambassador Z. Cernik, representative of Czechoslovakia.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Sweden, Bulgaria, Italy, the United States and Nigeria.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 1 March 1966, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 12.20 p.m.